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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State charged Cary W. Hartman with driving under the influence of drugs or
intoxicating substances after he got into a car accident on the interstate. Before trial, the district
court granted State's motion for the State's forensic scientist to testify via video teleconference.
The forensic scientist testified, by video teleconference, that Mr. Hartman had Ambien,
methamphetamine, and amphetamine in his blood sample obtained shortly after the accident. The
jury found Mr. Hartman guilty. Mr. Hartman appeals, and he argues the district court abused its
discretion by allowing the forensic scientist to testify by video teleconference. Due to this error,
Mr. Hartman respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his
case for a new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Hartman with driving under the influence of drugs or an
intoxicating substance ("DUI"), a felony due to two prior DUI convictions. (R., pp.24-25.)
Mr. Hartman pled not guilty, and the district court set the case for a jury trial. (R., p.27.)
Before trial, the State filed a motion to allow video teleconference testimony of Sarah
Pickle, a forensic scientist at the Idaho State Forensic Laboratory in Pocatello. 1 (R., p.49.) The
State made the motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule ("I.C.R.") 43.2. (R., p.49.) Mr. Hartman
objected because Ms. Pickle was "a crucial witness" to proving Mr. Hartman "had drugs in his
system," and Mr. Hartman "need[ed] her to be present in person before the jury in order to get
the full benefit of cross-examination." (Aug. R., p.1)

1

The State had filed two prior motions to allow remote video testimony, but the district court
denied both those motions as "moot without prejudice to renewal" after trial continuances.
(R., pp.31, 34, 38, 46.)

1

The district court held a hearing on the State's motion. (R., p.53.) At the hearing, the
State argued Ms. Pickle's testimony "is going to be pretty dry," and the State did not believe it
was necessary for her to drive from Pocatello to Boise to testify in person. (Tr. Vol. I, 2 p.5, L.20p.6, L. 1.) Mr. Hartman argued, unlike an alcohol-related DUI, Ms. Pickle was the "crucial
witness" to prove Mr. Hartman had the alleged substances in his blood while driving. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.6, L.20-p.7, L.13.) Mr. Hartman highlighted there were no field sobriety tests or "other things
that we normally have associated with DUis to indicate that someone's under the influence."
(Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.18-20, p.7, Ls.1-13.) Mr. Hartman asserted it was "important" for the jurors
to see her in person and judge her credibility and the weight to be given to her testimony.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.7, L.14-p.8, L.1.) Mr. Hartman concluded I.C.R. 43.2 was a discretionary rule, "so
it would be our preference, I think, to get the fairest trial, to have her here in person." (Tr. Vol. I,
p.8, Ls.2-5.)
The district court then asked Mr. Hartman, "What do you believe is the test I'm supposed
to exercise here, [defense counsel]? Use of discretion, whether it's reasonable? What's the test?"
(Tr. Vol. I, p.8, Ls.16-18.) Mr. Hartman answered the "predominant factor" to weigh was the
constitutional right to cross-examine and confront witnesses at trial. (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, Ls.19-25.)
Mr. Hartman continued, "[W]hether it's a . . . more reasonable request than not, or

2

The transcripts on appeal are contained in two separate documents. The first document, titled
"Trans.-Hartman.pdf," contains transcripts of the sentencing hearing, held on July 16, 2019, and
the two-day jury trial, held on February 7 and 8, 2019. The second document, titled
"Supplemental Transcript.pdf," contains a hearing on the State's motion to allow video
teleconference testimony, held on February 5, 2019. For citation purposes here, citations to
"Tr. Vol. I" refer to the transcript of the hearing on the State's motion from "Supplemental
Transcript.pdf." Citations to "Tr. Vol. II" refer to the two-day jury trial, which begins on page
sixteen of "Trans.-Hartman.pdf." Citations to "Tr. Vol. III" refer to the sentencing hearing,
which begins on page one of"Trans.-Hartman.pdf.".
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preponderance, honestly, frankly, I couldn't answer that. When [Rule 43.2] says 'may,' ... I'm
inclined to think it's in your discretion .... "(Tr.Vol. I, p.9, Ls.1-5.) Mr. Hartman reiterated:
If this were a possession case, she's going to testify it's meth and our argument
was someone else had used the car or ... "I didn't possess it," that sort of thing,
then I think it would be of less consequence. But in this case, she's going to
testify to something that, in the context of this case, is inflammatory in the sense
that, in the blood system, there are these two substances, and then be subject to
cross and exactly how far can you go with that, what does that mean? In other
words, we 're not testing for - we don't have level for methamphetamine or these
other drugs that equate to .08 for DUis and those sorts of things. So I just think
that she's a more crucial witness in this type of case, and that's why I'm asking
that she be present.

(Tr. Vol. I, p.9, L.12-p.10, L.1.) The district court asked the State if it had to make a finding of
necessity or was there "some other reason" why it did not have to make a necessity finding.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.13-16.) The State responded, "There's no necessity either way. I agree with
[defense counsel]. This is a matter of your discretion." (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.17-19.) The district
court asked defense counsel the same question, "[I]t's not a question of whether the State's
necessary [sic], it's a question of my discretion?" (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.20-22.) Mr. Hartman
answered: "Yeah, I don't think in this case it is. I think there could be a case and circumstances
where it was of necessity, but I don't believe in this case it is." (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, L.23-p.11, L.1.)
The district court followed up: "And the State doesn't have to show necessity, just a matter of
discretion?" (Tr. Vol. I, p.11, Ls.2-3.) Mr. Hartman responded, "I don't think they have to show
necessity." (Tr. Vol. I, p.11, Ls.4-5.) After his response, the State interjected, "And certainly as
to that, Your Honor, there is no necessity. She's around. She's available. She can drive over. It's
a matter of convenience." (Tr. Vol. I, p.11, Ls.6-7.)
The district court then ruled:
All right. So here's where this is going to land. There's, of course, the
preeminent case on the use of video testimony during trial, is Maryland v. Craig,
[497 U.S. 836 (1990),] a Supreme Court case. It was a case involving a child
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testifying against a sexual abuser, and they did it one-way. The U.S. Supreme
Court allowed it in that case. Here we're proposing two-way testimony, which is
the standard set out in Rule 43.2, and there are specific safeguards in 43.2 that
include, for instance, that the witness has to be able to see the defendant and the
defendant has to be able to see the witness.
In that case, Maryland v. Craig, it was a two-part test. The State did have
to show the video was necessary to further important public policy. The second
part was the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.
There's a case on appeal on this question out of Canyon County. This is
the case of State v. Woods. 3 This is Idaho Supreme Court No. 45094, and the
question presented in that case that's pending right now is whether 43.2 is
permissible in light of that Supreme Court case, particularly that first prong under
Craig, whether the State is necessary -- has shown necessity for it. Neither party
is arguing that. Both parties are arguing the question of the second test, the
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. And in a case called [United
States] v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 [(2d Cir. 1999)], from the Second Circuit, it says
the salutary effects of face-to-face confrontation include: 1, giving of testimony
under oath, which would be here; 2, the opportunity for cross-examination, which
would be present here; 3, the opportunity of the fact finder to observe the
demeanor evidence or the jury to see the witness. That would also be here. And 4,
reduce risk the witness will wrongfully implicate against the defendant when
testifying in his presence, which is met when the witness can see the defendant.
All four parts of that test are met.
In that [Maryland] v. Craig, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there's no
absolute right to a face-to-face meeting of witnesses during trial. Instead, there is
a different standard. The question then goes to - this is what I call the evidence as
to that, forensic testimony within the scope of 43 .2 would be sufficient for the
jury to make its determination of the credibility of the witness. They may or may
not believe the witness in this case, but it could be adequately done by the video
conference, and I'll be the guardian to make sure it's an adequate feed, both audio
and video, to make sure that's the case. So the parties are arguing prong two of
Craig. That's the dispute. On that basis, I will find for the prosecution, and we
will proceed to trial under 43.2.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.11, L.9-p.13, L.11.) The district court issued an order allowing the video
teleconference testimony of Ms. Pickle. (R., p.51.)

3

In State v. Woods, the Court of Appeals did not consider whether I.C.R. 43.2 was permissible in
light of Craig or examine necessity prong. 165 Idaho 329, 444 P.3d 901, 904 (Ct. App. 2019).
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, there was error, but any error was harmless. Id.
at 904-06.
4

Mr. Hartman proceeded to trial. The State's evidence showed that, around 5:00 a.m., an
eyewitness saw a car speed down an on-ramp onto 1-84, hit the far left concrete guardrail, tum
back around, and hit the far right guardrail. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.122, L.18-p.125, L.19.) This
eyewitness testified that she saw no other cars on the road at that time. (Tr. Vol. II, p.126, Ls.1322.) The State's evidence also showed that the paramedics and the police arrived to the scene of
the crash. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.158, L.12-p.159, L.13.) Mr. Hartman was the driver and the only
person in the car. (Tr. Vol. II, p.161, Ls.5-23.) A police officer at the scene testified that he was
unable to conduct any field sobriety tests because Mr. Hartman was taken to the hospital with
life-threatening injuries, including eight broken ribs and internal bleeding from his spleen.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.147, L.24-p.148, L.15, p.161, Ls.16-18, p.169, Ls.2-7, p.174, Ls.13-18.) The
officer also testified that, based on his review of the scene and tire tracks, the speeding car
actually came from the interstate, not the on-ramp, before the car zigzagged between the
guardrails. (Tr. Vol. II, p.188, L.5-p.189, L.14.) At the hospital, the officer had a nurse take a
blood sample. (Tr. Vol. II, p.137, Ls.1-16, p.170, Ls.18-25.) The nurse testified that he had not
given Mr. Hartman Zolpidem (Ambien) or methamphetamine before the blood draw. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.138, L.19-p.139, L.16.) Ms. Pickle was the last witness in the State's case-in-chief, and she
testified via video teleconference. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.214, L.15-p.246, L.23.) She testified that
Mr. Hartman had Zolpidem, methamphetamine, and amphetamine in his blood. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.228, L.25-p.229, L.4.)
Mr. Hartman testified in his defense. He testified that he swerved to avoid a car speeding
down the on-ramp, and he did not remember much else. (Tr. Vol. II, p.279, L.1-p.280, L.23.) He
said that he had taken Ambien the night before the accident around 9:00 p.m. (Tr. Vol. II, p.277,
Ls.3-7.) He testified that he had taken it every night for eight to ten years, and he did not feel the
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effects in the morning. (Tr. Vol. II, p.274, Ls.1-10, p.275, Ls.11-21.) He also testified that he
had been taking an old inhaler, over-the-counter cold medicine pills, and Vick's vapor rub for a
cold. (Tr. Vol. II, p.278, Ls.11-25.) On rebuttal, the State called a pharmacist that testified that
an inhaler, over-the-counter cold medicine pills, and Vick's vapor rub did not contain
methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.292, L.18-p.292, L.7.) The jury found Mr. Hartman guilty.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.338, L.l 7-p.339, L.3; R., p.67.) Mr. Hartman admitted to two prior DUI
convictions. (Tr. Vol. II, p.34 7, Ls.4-11.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Hartman to ten years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. III,
p.33, Ls.7-14.) Mr. Hartman timely appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.106-08, 110-12.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the State's forensic scientist to testify
via video teleconference?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The State's Forensic Scientist To
Testify Via Video Teleconference
A.

Introduction
Mr. Hartman asserts the district court abused its discretion in two ways when it allowed

the State to offer testimony from forensic scientist Ms. Pickle via video teleconference. First, he
argues the district court did not perceive its decision as discretionary. Second, he argues the
district court did not apply the correct legal standards. Both of these discretionary errors stem
from the district court incorrectly identifying and applying the rigid constitutional standard from
Maryland v. Craig rather than a purely discretionary test to allow this testimony. Due to this

discretionary error, Mr. Hartman respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand his case for a new, error-free decision.

B.

Standard Of Review
When determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court
considers "[w ]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise ofreason."

State v. Weigle, 165 Idaho 482, 447 P.3d 930, 937 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Perceive The Issue As Discretionary Or Apply The Correct
Legal Standards By Allowing The State's Forensic Scientist To Testify Via Video
Teleconference
Mr. Hartman maintains the district court did not perceive its ruling as discretionary or

apply the correct legal standards because the district court employed a constitutional two-part
test instead of exercising its discretion under the totality of the circumstances. He further asserts,
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had the district court considered all the factors and not been bound by the constitutional standard,
it would not have granted the State's motion to allow Ms. Pickle to testify via video conference.
I.C.R. 43.2 governs the process for the admission of testimony by video teleconference. It
states in full:
Forensic testimony may be offered by video teleconference. For testimony by
video teleconference to be admissible:
(a) Witness Visible to Participants. The forensic scientist must be visible to the
court, defendant, counsel, jury, and others physically present in the courtroom.
(1) The court and the forensic scientist must be able to see and hear each
other simultaneously and communicate with each other during the
proceeding.
(2) The defendant, counsel from both sides, and the forensic scientist must
be able to see and hear each other simultaneously and communicate with
each other during the proceeding.
(3) A defendant who is represented by counsel must be able to consult
privately with defense counsel during the proceeding.
(b) Written Notice Required. The party intending to submit testimony by video
teleconference must give written notice to the court and opposing party 28 days
before the proceeding date.
(c) Written Notice of Objection or Affirmative Consent. A party opposing the
giving of testimony by video teleconference must give the court and opposing
party written notification of objection or affirmative consent at least 14 days
before the proceeding date.
(d) Party Responsible for Coordinating. The party seeking to introduce testimony
by video teleconference is responsible for coordinating the audiovisual feed into
the courtroom. Nothing in this rule requires court personnel to assist in the
preparation or presentation of the testimony provided by the provisions of this
rule.
The testimony must be recorded in the same manner as any other testimony in the
proceeding.
I.C.R. 43.2. This rule is procedural in nature. It regulates the "mechanical operations" for the
parties to provide notice of, coordinate, and present this testimony and for the trial court to
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facilitate and record this testimony. See Weigle, 44 7 P .3d at 935 (discussing the test for
procedural versus substantive law). 4 This rule does not create, define, or regulate primary rights.
Id. It is "an operation by which the applicable process"-forensic testimony by video

teleconference-"is implemented." Id.
Moreover, I.C.R. 43.2 vests the trial courts with discretion to allow the parties to offer
forensic testimony by video teleconference. Idaho appellate courts have recognized that the use
of "may" in an Idaho Criminal Rule denotes a discretionary decision by the district court. See
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 12 (2013) ("may" in I.C.R. 17(b) on quashing or modifying subpoenas

"suggests" a discretionary decision that the Court reviews for an abuse of discretion); State v.
Harbaugh, 123 Idaho 835, 837 (1993) (the use of"may" in I.C.R. 33(c) for withdrawal of guilty

pleas makes "clear" that the trial court's decision "lies within its discretion"); State v. Jacobson,
150 Idaho 131, 138 (Ct. App. 2010) ("may dismiss" in I.C.R. 48(a) is a permissive term that the
Court reviews for an abuse of discretion); see also State v. Dudley, 104 Idaho 849, 851 (Ct. App.
1983) ("[I.C.R.] 48 did not mandate a dismissal; rather, it employed the term "may" and vested
in the district court a discretionary power to dismiss."). I.C.R. 43.2 also uses "may": "Forensic
testimony may be offered by video teleconference." I.C.R. 43.2 (emphasis added). As such, the
district court's decision to allow this forensic testimony lies within its discretion.
In contrast with the procedural elements and grant of discretion in I.C.R. 43.2, a specific
and substantive two-part test governs the constitutional standard to allow video testimony. In
4

In Weigle, the Court considered whether demonstrative exhibits could be given to the jury
during deliberations. 447 P.3d at 934-37. After recognizing that no rule provided guidance, and
the statute most closely on point was a nullity, id. at 934-35, the Court held, "Trial judges are
endowed with the discretion to determine whether demonstrative exhibits should be provided to
the jury during its deliberations," Id. at 935. In reaching this holding, the Court reasoned, "Trial
courts maintain broad discretion in admitting and excluding evidence . . . . [Idaho Rule of
Evidence] 611 supports this broad discretion. It reads, 'The court should exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of ... presenting evidence .... "' Id. (quoting I.R.E. 611(a)).
10

Craig, 497 U.S. 836, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the use of a one-way closed
circuit television to present a child witness's testimony to the jury violated the defendant's
Confrontation Clause right. Id. at 840. The U.S. Supreme Court first concluded, on review of its
precedent, that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not an "absolute," but a "preference." Id.
at 844-50. Nevertheless, this preference could not be "easily be dispensed with." Id. at 850.
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court outlined two factors for consideration before allowing the
"denial of such confrontation": necessity and reliability. Id. at 851-60. The U.S. Supreme Court
reasoned, if "denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy" and
"the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured," "a defendant's right to confront accusatory
witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation." Id. at 850. The State,
however, must make "an adequate showing of necessity." Id. at 855. The State must show the
use of a procedure other than physical confrontation "is necessary to further an important state
interest." Id. at 852. "The requisite finding of necessity" is "case-specific." Id. at 855. If a
"proper finding of necessity has been made," and the alternative procedure "ensures the
reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to rigorous adversarial testing," "the admission of such
testimony would be consonant with the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 857. In light of this
standard, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded Craig for "a case-specific fmding of necessity." 5
In sum, I.C.R. 43.2 and the Confrontation Clause impose separate requirements on the
admission of testimony by video teleconference. I.C.R. 43.2 vests the district court with
discretion to allow such testimony, which appropriately aligns with the discretion afforded to the
district court on the admission and presentation of evidence in its courtroom. The rule also

5

The Court acknowledged the procedure satisfied the reliability factor and the State's interest in
protecting the child witness from trauma was "sufficiently important to justify a special
procedure." Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
11

imposes certain procedural requirements for admission, including notice, witness visibility, realtime communication, and recording. I.C.R. 43.2(a), (b ). Conversely, the Confrontation Clause
requires the district court make a "requisite finding of necessity" for a non-face-to-face
procedure that furthers an important State interest. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855. The district court also
must find that such procedure is still "reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a
manner functionally equivalent" to physical confrontation. Id. at 851. If both factors are met, the
procedure does not violate the Confrontation Clause. The Craig standard thus governs the
constitutionality of such testimony, while I.C.R. 43.2 governs its procedure and grants discretion
to the district court. As such, the proposed video teleconference could satisfy the constitutional
standard, but still be excluded under I.C.R. 43.2. These are separate tests. I.C.R. 43.2 does not
incorporate the constitutional standard from Craig.
Due to these separate requirements, the district court here did not perceive the issue as
discretionary or act consistently with the legal standards because it superimposed the Craig
standard onto I.C.R. 43.2. In the district court, Mr. Hartman argued the district court's decision
was "totally in [its] discretion," (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.3), but the district court used the Craig
standard instead. The district court determined neither party was arguing necessity, so it had to
consider reliability only. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.7-9.) Since the video teleconference method was
"reliable" under the constitutional standard, the district court allowed Ms. Pickle's forensic
testimony. 6 (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, L.9-p.13, L.11.) In employing the Craig test, the district court did

6

Mr. Hartman's counsel did not make a separate Confrontation Clause objection to Ms. Pickle's
video teleconference testimony. His counsel also conceded the State did not have to show
necessity. (Tr. Vol. I, p.11, Ls.4-5.) However, if his counsel had objected on this constitutional
basis, the State could not have made "an adequate showing of necessity." Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
In fact, the State admitted there was "no necessity" and its request was purely "a matter of
convenience" (so Ms. Pickle did not have to drive from Pocatello). (Tr. Vol. I, p.11, Ls.6-8.)
Moreover, the district court did not correctly apply the Craig standard because the district court
12

not recognize its decision was discretionary. The district court's oral ruling did not explicitly
state its decision was discretionary, and the record does not reflect that the district court
perceived the issue as discretionary. See State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 114 (2018) ("A court
is not required to explicitly make a finding regarding its discretion if the record clearly shows
that the court correctly perceived the issue."). Rather, even though the district court asked the
parties if its decision was discretionary and the parties agreed it was, the district court's ruling
shows that it perceived the issue to be a strict "checklist" of necessity (which was not argued)
and reliability. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.11, L.9-p.13, L.11.). Having essentially a waiver on necessity,
the district court understood that it had to consider whether the method was reliable and, if it
was, allow the testimony. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.7-21, p.13, Ls.9-11.) This test, as perceived by the
district court, contained no discretion.
Moreover, the district court did not act consistently with the correct legal standards.
Again, the district court applied Craig when it should have weighed the totality of the
circumstances. Under I.C.R. 43.2, the district court is not merely bound by necessity versus
reliability. The district court can and should consider all relevant circumstances of the case,
including the nature and importance of the forensic testimony, the preference for face-to-face
confrontation, the proponent's reason for video teleconference testimony, any potential for
prejudicial effect or confusion of the issues, and the reliability of the video teleconference. The
district court did not weigh all the facts here; it viewed its decision through the narrow lens of
necessity and reliability. This was inconsistent with the discretionary standard in I.C.R. 43.2.

seemed to determine that, even if there was no necessity, the alternative procedure could be used
ifreliable. This is wholly inconsistent with Craig's requirement of both necessity and reliability.
Thus, it is highly unlikely that Ms. Pickle's video teleconference testimony would have been
allowed had Mr. Hartman's counsel objected on constitutional grounds and the district court
applied the correct standard. Moreover, although not argued below, Mr. Hartman notes, if I.C.R.
43 .2 is intended to supplant Craig for forensic testimony, the rule is likely unconstitutional.
13

The district court, therefore, abused its discretion by allowing the State to present
Ms. Pickle's testimony by video teleconference. "Ordinarily, when a discretionary ruling has
been tainted by a legal or factual error, [the Court must] vacate the decision and remand the
matter for a new, error-free discretionary determination by the trial court." State v. Medrain, 143
Idaho 329, 333 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1995)). The
State can avoid a remand, however, "where it is apparent from the record that the result would
not change or that a different result would represent an abuse of discretion." Id. (citing Upton,
127 Idaho at 276). The State will be unable to meet this burden. The district court clearly
articulated the incorrect standard, and it is not apparent from the record that the result would not
change. The State's sole reason for the video teleconference request was to avoid having
Ms. Pickle drive four hours. On the other hand, Ms. Pickle's testimony was important. It was the
only evidence to prove Mr. Hartman was intoxicated when driving. Her testimony went to the
very nature of this case: driving under the influence of drugs or intoxicating substances. Looking
at the totality of the circumstances, a proper exercise of discretion would have required
Ms. Pickle to testify in person. Due to this discretionary error, Mr. Hartman respectfully requests
this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new, error-free
discretionary decision.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Hartman respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand his case for a new trial.
DATED this 7th day of February, 2020.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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